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Socialized Medicine: An Analysis of
Bureaucratic Inefficiency
I. Introduction
Health is undoubtedly a precious commodity.' The extraordi-
nary advances in medical technology of this century have created the
emergence of a new "health consciousness," and with it increased
expectations of health consumers.2 As a result, in order to protect
and promote health, legislation has attempted to create a proper bal-
ance between the public interest and individual rights.3 The World
Health Organization (WHO)" recognized access to health as one of
the fundamental rights possessed by every human being.5 In 1977,
WHO proclaimed "[t]he main goal of [health legislation] in the
coming decades should be the attainment of all citizens of the world,
by the year 2000, of a level of health that will permit them to lead a
socially and economically productive life." 6
This Comment focuses on a form of health legislation which at-
tempts to meet these goals. In analyzing the health care systems of
Great Britain and Canada, this Comment examines the policies and
reasons behind the passing of legislation which led to the advent of
socialized medicine in these two nations. In addition, a discussion of
the operation of these socialized health systems illustrates the tur-
moil and complexity associated with government medicine, and the
need for subsequent legislative reforms. As this Comment reveals,
these socialized systems, where overriding political objectives create
further misallocation of resources and decreased quality of care, fail
to provide a viable solution to American health concerns. Instead,
1. The World Health Organization (WHO), see infra note 4, defines health as "[a] state
of complete physical, mental, and social well-being." C. LINDSAY, NEW DIRECTIONS IN PUBLIC
HEALTH CARE: A PRESCRIPTION FOR THE 1980s 16 (1980) [hereinafter C. LINSDAY].
2. Pinet, The WHO European Program of Health Legislation and the Health for All
Policy, 12 AM. J.L. & MEO. 441, 442 (1986).
3. Id.
4. In 1948, the United Nations created the World Health Organization (WHO), an
international agency which specializes in health and deals with health issues on a global scale.
The goal of the Organization is to lead the world toward a strong, new international health
movement by way of a common health policy based on health care for all. See id. at 441-44.
For a critical view of the policies of WHO, see LINDSAY, supra note 1, at 53. Here, the author
states that of the studies conducted by WHO, which may serve as the bases of the Organiza-
tion's policies, "should be taken with a pinch of salt," since the figures for these studies are
supplied by the respective governments involved. Id.
5. CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION.
6. World Health Assembly Resolution, WHA 30.43 (1977).
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reforms should be undertaken within the present market system, a
structure that remains flexible to change and promotes innovation.
II. Status of American Health Care
American medicine is in a state of unrest.7 In recent years,
health care has progressed to the forefront of American concerns as
medical costs continually soar and inequities in the accessibility of
care multiply.8 "Though it remains the most widely respected of pro-
fessions, though it has never been more technically powerful, it is in
trouble both from without and from within."9 As a result of these
increasing problems, health care has vaulted onto the political play-
ing field.1" Each year, political pressure on the United States govern-
ment intensifies, urging for some form of universal and comprehen-
sive government intervention into the health care market. 1 Would a
socialized system, under the financial and decision-making control of
government alone, be cohesive and effective in the framework of the
American health care establishment?
In order to effectively assess the validity of such a proposal, it
seems logical to analyze the experiences and lessons of countries al-
ready utilizing such socialized programs. 2 Throughout the world,
health care is provided through the use of "varying combinations of
government financing and control.113 Yet for the most part, the rela-
tive youth of many of these systems renders an analysis of their per-
formance most difficult and speculative at best. 4
The British system, however, provides an established model of
centralized financing of health care for such an analysis.' 5 Buttressed
on the foundation of collective responsibility by the state to provide
comprehensive medical care,'" available on the basis of equal access
7. C. LINDSAY, supra note 1, at 11.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 12. "A right to health care is frequently claimed and embraced by politi-
cians." Id.
11. C. LINDSAY, NATIONAL HEALTH ISSUES: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 1 (1980) [herein-
after NATIONAL HEALTH ISSUES]. For a discussion of many of the proposals for a form of
national health insurance in the United States, see LINDSAY, supra note 1, at 167-92.
12. NATIONAL HEALTH ISSUES, supra note 11, at 1.
13. C. LINDSAY, supra note 1, at 52; NATIONAL HEALTH ISSUES, supra note I1, at 1.
"Most countries in the world today, including the United States, intervene and subsidize medi-
cal care to a larger or smaller degree." Id. The United States, for example, finances Medicaid
(which provides health services for the poor and mentally indigent) and Medicare (which pro-
vides health services for the elderly). In addition, Massachusetts has instituted a government-
financed health care system known as the Department of Medical Society (DMS). See the
Health Security Act of 1988.
14. NATIONAL HEALTH ISSUES, supra note 11, at 1. Lindsay, as well as acknowledging
the youth of such systems, points out that many of these new systems are still evolving, there-
fore rendering a determination of their respective effectiveness somewhat premature. Id.
15. C. LINDSAY, supra note 1, at 53.
16. J. ALLSOp, HEALTH POLICY AND THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE 11 (1984) [here-
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to all,17 the British system, initiated in 1948,18 exemplifies central-
ized medicine "approaching a state of long-run, full adjustment
equilibrium."' 9 In addition, Canada, sharing many of the same cul-
ture and values of the United States, provides another useful study
as a nation adopting elements of a national health insurance.2 0 Al-
though the advent of this system has been relatively recent, Canada's
experiences can be educational to an American health care system
under fire.
III. Great Britain
The birth of the National Health Service " in Britain evolved as
a result of a "broad consensus of public and political opinion in favor
of the establishment of a national health care system, free at the
point of service."22 With the public yearning for the organization of
medicine, three essential ideas emerged from this social uprising
which provided a foundation for the adoption of the National Health
Service:
(1) access to medical care should depend on need as op-
posed to means;
(2) the organization of resources in the health care arena is
achieved within a government framework where it can be explic-
itly "planned;" and
(3) health care is a right owed by the government to each
of its citizens.2
Clearly this notion exemplified the prevailing collective principle
at the time that the state is responsible for its citizens.2 4 Moreover,
this idea embraced the times and needs of a nation debilitated by the
scourge of the Second World War, and epitomized the social welfare
and service state being molded by post-war Labour government. 5
Aneurin Bevan, the Minister of Health in 1946 stated:
Society becomes more wholesome, more serene, and spiritu-
ally healthier, if it knows that its citizens have at the back of
inafter ALLSOP].
17. Id.
18. MEDICAL CARE IN ENGLAND UNDER THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE, REPORT TO
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, at I (1950) [hereinafter
MEDICAL CARE].
19. NATIONAL HEALTH ISSUES, supra note II, at I.
20. C. LINDSAY, supra note I, at 53.
21. This radical program, which changed the British medical system forever, was a
product of the National Health Service Act of 1946, born on "The Appointed Day," July 5,
1948. See MEDICAL CARE, supra note 18, at I; National Health Service Act, 1946, 9 & 10
Geo. 6, ch. 81 [hereinafter NHS Act].
22. J. ALLSOP, supra note 16, at 11; see NHS Act, supra note 21, at § 1(2).
23. NATIONAL HEALTH ISSUES, supra note II, at 18-19.
24. J. ALLSOP, supra note 16, at 12.
25. Id.
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their consciousness, the knowledge that not only themselves, but
all their fellows, have access, when ill, to the best medical skills
can provide. 6
Yet, the development of this social uprising found its origins much
earlier.1
7
A. History and Background of the Act
There is little doubt that, while the National Health Service
(NHS) substantiated a sudden and radical change in the British
health care arena, conditions favorable for its adoption had been de-
veloping for many years. 8 The British government's involvement in
medical care dates back as far as the post-Napoleonic War era. 9 In
contrast to the humanitarian ideals expressed by the subsequent
drafters of the NHS,30 this initial government intervention was moti-
vated by economic factors."' Under the guise of the Poor Law, 2 the
government provided basic health services3 to the poor based on
"the simple principle that early recovery from illness would return
workers to the labor force and thus accelerate their departure from
the welfare rolls." 4 This system of hospital care3 5 grew concurrently
with the voluntary hospitals36  arising out of the monastic age,
37
which also provided "vestigial general-practitioner care to the very
26. Id. This quote from Bevan, the Minister of Health in the 1945 Labour government,
represented the cornerstone of this socialist movement. Bevan maintained that the government
had an obligation to provide free access to health care through collective action. In support of
this belief, he likened health care to the railways. In both instances, he advocated the use of a
strong centralized organization by the state to provide a service equally accessible to all citi-
zens on the sole basis of need.
27. NATIONAL HEALTH ISSUES, supra note 11, at 5.
28. MEDICAL CARE, supra note 18, at 2.
29. NATIONAL HEALTH ISSUES, supra note 11, at 5.
30. This humanitarian view was clearly expressed by the earlier discussion of Minister
of Health Bevan, see supra note 26.
31. NATIONAL HEALTH ISSUES, supra note II, at I.
32. Poor Law Act, 1927, 17 & 18 Geo. 5, ch. 14 [hereinafter Poor Law]. This law was
later overturned in 1930.
33. Id. at § 2; see also NATIONAL HEALTH ISSUES, supra note 11, at 5. "Only the sim-
plest treatments were provided, and the prescription of medicines was forbidden. Furthermore,
Poor Law doctors were hired on the basis of 'competitive trade,' whereby the appointments
went to physicians willing to do the work for the lowest pay, regardless of qualifications." Id.
34. NATIONAL HEALTH ISSUES, supra note 11, at 5.
35. Poor Law, supra note 32, at § 2(3); see also MEDICAL CARE, supra note 18, at 3.
The care provided by this system varied considerably from hospital to hospital. In addition to
the larger municipal hospitals that were utilized by this Act, many smaller "cottage hospitals"
emerged throughout smaller towns, some of which were also created by local public health
authorities. Id.
36. This system of hospitals provided a shelter of "refuge for the destitute sick." Despite
a period of inactivity, during Henry VIlil's seizure of the monasteries, these hospitals reopened
and continued to predominantly serve the indigent of Britain. These hospitals were primarily
supported through "permanent endowments, gifts and money derived from contributory
plans." Patients, who were restricted to low incomes, were required to pay only the amount of
money they could afford. MEDICAL CARE, supra note 18, at 2.




This government intervention into the medical care system, ex-
panding through involvement in the related problem areas of disease
and sanitation," continued with the introduction in 1911 of the Na-
tional Health Insurance Act.40 By this time, "the modern medical
revolution had already begun." '41 As a result, the demand for medi-
cal services increased, coupled with an increased standard of living,
so citizens began to expect "better treatment and were prepared to
pay for it, either directly or through taxes."42
After the abolition of the Poor Law, the Local Health Authori-
ties assumed control of this hospital system and began to expand and
upgrade the services provided.43 This increased government involve-
ment, strengthened by the British Medical Association's long-time
urging for a coordination of the voluntary and municipal hospital
systems"" and the national hospital service established during the
Second World War,"5 rendered the establishment of an even stronger
centralized government medical plan an inevitable progression. As
this brief history indicates, the British people had been provided with
a great deal of medical social service, and had grown accustomed to
relying on their government to provide the basics of health care.4
B. The National Health Service
1. Emergence of the Act.-With the nation engrossed in the
turmoil of the Second World War, the social service movement
emerged at the forefront of British existence. In 1942, as part of a
government probe into the organization of domestic medicine, Sir
William Beveridge produced the infamous "White Paper." '47 This re-
port called for a "reorganization of the industry into a highly cen-
tralized system directed by the Minister of Health through large re-
gional administrative bodies." '48  Beveridge proposed a broad
38. J. VAIZEY, NATIONAL HEALTH 91 (1984) [hereinafter J. VAIZEY].
39. MEDICAL CARE, supra note 18, at 4.
40. National Insurance Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 55; see also J. ALLSOP, supra note
16, at 22. "The 1911 Act is significant as a first attempt by the state to cushion a section of
the working class from the costs of illness and provided for personal medical care." Id.
41. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 92.
42. Id.
43. MEDICAL CARE, supra note 18, at 5. In 1930, 146 separate health authorities oper-
ated in eighty-three towns and countries. They controlled the municipal hospitals and the envi-
ronmental sanitation situation. Id.
44. Id. at 4. "The British Medical Association had long advocated some form of correla-
tion, preferably on a regional basis, so as to establish a more coordinated system of hospitals."
Id.
45. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 92.
46. MEDICAL CARE, supra note 18, at 5.
47. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, A National Health Service, Cmnd 6502, HMSO (1944);
NATIONAL HEALTH ISSUES, supra note 11, at 12; J. ALLSOP, supra note 16, at 16.
48. NATIONAL HEALTH ISSUES, supra note 11, at 12. This report also designated that
hospitals would fall under the administrative controls of government and that hospital invest-
Fall 19891
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comprehensive medical care system"9 that "would prevent ill-health
and rehabilitate the sick after illness and so make the nation fitter
and more productive."5 This report not only recognized the collec-
tive responsibility of the government to provide health care to its
citizens,5 but also asserted that "the impact of a health service
would be to reduce the overall costs of social security by making
people healthier."52
Following the publication of this report, the Conservative coali-
tion government accepted the principle of such a comprehensive na-
tional medical service, and began to research a health service which
would please all parties involved.3 In the National Health Service
Act of 1946, drafted by Minister of Health Aneurin Bevan54 of the
newly elected Labour government,55 a tripartite system was proposed
which offered a compromise."6 The Act placed the responsibility of
operating this comprehensive plan on the Minister of Health,57
through the use of three main channels:
(1) The hospitals were nationalized and administered by
the Regional Hospital Boards;
(2) The Local Health Authority was given administrative
control over the local health and welfare service; and
(3) The general practitioners remained independent, self-
employed, able to contract with the state (through local execu-
tive councils) on a capitation basis. 58
The proposed National Health Service gained virtually unani-
mous political support while the idea of a free health service on de-
mand was understandably very popular with the public. 59 As a re-
ment would be planned on a national scale." Id.
49. See NATIONAL HEALTH ISSUES, supra note 11, at 12-13. Beveridge urged his govern-
ment to adopt such a national health care system. He stated in the "White Paper" that:
After a trial of a different principle, it has been found to accord best with
the sentiments of the British people that an insurance organized by the commu-
nity by use of compulsory powers, each individual should stand on the same
terms; . . .[tlhe term "social insurance" to describe this institution implies both
that it is compulsory and that men stand together as follows.
Id.
50. J. ALLSOP, supra note 16, at 26.
51. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
52. J. ALLSOP, supra note 16, at 26.
53. Id. at 27. "The real arguments were now about the relationships between the medi-
cal profession and the state, and the extent to which different interest groups, within the pro-
fession, particularly the hospital doctors and the GPs would accept becoming employees of the
state ...." Id.
54. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
55. NATIONAL HEALTH ISSUES, supra note 11, at 17.
56. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 92; see also J. ALLSOP, supra note 16, at. 27-28.
57. For more information regarding the powers and duties of the Minister of Health, see
NHS Act, supra note 21, at §§ 1, 6.
58. See NHS Act, supra note 21; MEDICAL CARE, supra note 18, at 8; J. ALLSOP, supra
note 16, at 27-28; J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 92-93.
59. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 93.
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suit, the Act was adopted by Parliament on July 5, 1948.60 Notably,
the main structure of the system remained largely intact until the
1960s."' Yet, the NHS, symbolizing Britain's high hopes for a better
future in medical care,62 encountered an array of complex turmoil63
as it ventured out of the minds of its drafters into the harsh realm of
the real world.
6 4
2. Application of the Act.-The years following the adoption
of the NHS can be divided into three distinct periods: the formative
period (1948-60), the managerial period (1960-early 70s), and the
period of reorganization (1974-present)."' The following subsections
briefly detail the progression and performance of the service
throughout these periods.
a. Formative Period, 1948-60.-Individuals in both the politi-
cal and medical sectors had great expectations for the benefits of the
institution they had created, but few had properly focused on the
actual performance of this system in regard to the multitude of diffi-
cult and complex tasks it had been assigned on paper.66
On the demand side, the NHS would have to replace a
price system in the rationing of available medical resources
among competing demanders of medical care. On the supply
side, the task was even more complex. First, total amounts of
resources for medical services had to be determined. Then the
total had to be parceled out among literally millions of potential
uses and users.6 7
Although a few benefits surfaced upon the introduction of the Act, 8
the deficiencies associated with the operation of the system were
abundant and readily apparent.
The disadvantages associated with the use of the tripartite sys-
tem were obvious.69 An example clearly illustrates this point: "pa-
60. NHS Act, supra note 21.
61. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 94; NATIONAL HEALTH ISSUES, supra note 11, at 17.
62. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 92.
63. See NATIONAL HEALTH ISSUES, supra note 11, at 34-35.
64. Id.
65. J. ALLSOP, supra note 16, at 36.
66. NATIONAL HEALTH ISSUES, supra note 1, at 34.
67. Id.
68. MEDICAL CARE, supra note 18, at 40. The Act did accomplish some good for the
British health care system:
I. It unified the disorganized hospital system and established a regional control
oriented around teaching centers.
2. It removed the financial barrier to some extent.
3. It provided some financial support to some struggling municipal hospitals.
4. It made the services of consultants accessible outside of hospitals and clinics
benefitting those who live in areas distant from the larger hospitals.
id.
69. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 92.
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tients with chronic and handicapping conditions requiring both hos-
pital and community-based services suffered from lack of
communication between branches. ' 70 Furthermore, the status of the
general practitioner, 71 once the "cornerstone of the service," 7 de-
creased in importance, as the hospital service rapidly became the vi-
tal cog in this centralized machine.7 3 As a result, although benefitted
by better income levels in some instances, the hospitals, which lacked
sufficient means for expansion and experienced an increase in operat-
ing costs, suffered from this massively increased work load.7' Conse-
quently, long , aiting lists for hospital appointments were created.7 5
Essentially, in addition to its basic organizational deficiencies,7
the explosion of medical innovation, which coincided with the estab-
lishment of the NHS, created unforeseen problems for the system.
77
This detonation created a tremendous expansion of costs, as a previ-
ously unmet demand became apparent and as the new medical tech-
niques produced more treatable cases.78 It became evident that the
British system lacked a strong structural basis. The NHS was based
on two fundamental fallacies.79 First, there was a substantial "back-
log" of untreated cases which would be eliminated by the more effi-
cient system; thereafter, the workload would decrease as the nation
got healthier.80 Second, the system was not prepared for the changes
in medicine as the "new" enemies of health multiplied.81
b. The Managerial Period, 1960-Early 1970's.-With more
than a decade past since its inception in 1948, the political and med-
70. Id.
71. See MEDICAL CARE, supra note 18, at 40-41. The gap between the specialist and
general practitioner (GP) grew, degrading the status of the GP. The system provided income
incentives only to the specialists, essentially destroying the private practitioner. For further
details regarding specialists and their incentives, see id. at 12-15.
72. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 93.
73. Id.
74. MEDICAL CARE, supra note 18, at 40.
75. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 94.
76. See MEDICAL CARE, supra note 18, at 40-41. The author further details the
problems created by the operation of the Act, such as:
I. The removal of the financial barrier seemed to benefit the middle rather
than the intended lower class.
2. Produced an unequal distribution of doctors in proportion to population.
3. Rendered the success of medicine dependent more on quantity rather than
quality.
4. Created complete autocratic control of the system.
5. Added nothing to preventive medicine.
6. Added to the costs of medical care by applying a great additional load onto
its medical facilities.
id.







ical communities began to recognize and address the complexities
prevalent in the system. "The major concern was that tripartite na-
ture of the NHS, and the way in which power was freely delegated
down the line from the centre, led to inadequate follow-through of
particular patients."82 With the structure segregated into three dis-
tinct entities, the system lacked efficient cooperation and planning.83
As a result, hospitals became the dominant form of medical
care, though it was evident on account of the vast increase in treata-
ble cases, that the majority of the medical treatment should take
place outside of the hospitals and in the communities.8 Yet, the
NHS, by offering only to the specialists various attractive incen-
tives,85 had depleted the supply of general practitioners needed to
adequately manage the task.8 6 There certainly appeared to be a mis-
allocation of resources.
Consequently, during this period, many individuals began to re-
alize that the workforce of the NHS was "continually increasing in
size and in complexity in terms of the division of labour."87 Due to
this increasing division and specialization of the medical field, the
government looked to the use of scientific management as an answer
to organize the work of these medical professionals and their rela-
tionship to each other8 8 Various government studies and reports
researched managerial methods which could improve the coordina-
tion and use of the professions and their resources. 9 Undoubtedly, it
was this managerialistic period which spawned the subsequent reor-
ganizational period of the 1970's and 80's.9o
c. The Period of Reorganization, 1974-present.-The nature
of the preceding period and its focus on the dilemmas associated
with the operation of the NHS served as the impetus for its reorgan-
ization. What was once a symbol of the future of British medicine in
1948, developed into nothing but a system engrossed in disarray by
82. Id. at 94; see also MEDICAL CARE, supra note 18, at 16.
83. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 94; C. LINDSAY, supra note 1, at 61; MEDICAL CARE,
supra note 18, at 39-44.
84. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 94.
85. MEDICAL CARE, supra note 18, at 20. The NHS, in an effort to improve the quality
of its hospitals, emphasized specialization in medical care. By offering the specialists higher
incomes and sending them out to the smaller hospitals, the general practitioner was driven
away. Id.
86. Id. at 42.
87. J. ALLSOP, supra note 16, at 58. The workforce issue continued to be a problem
after this period. "To illustrate, in 1949, the total number of staff employed in the NHS of
England was approximately 400,000, but by 1980 there had been a two-fold increase to
822,389." Id.
88. Id. at 59.
89. Id. at 60.
90. Id.
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1973.91 Clearly, something had to be done to improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of the service. Hence, the reorganization of 1974.92
It [the reorganization] was based on the notion of the es-
sential unity of the NHS and designed to transform it into a
more efficient and effective service through a change in struc-
ture, the strengthening of management and the introduction of a
planning system.9"
Unfortunately, what was to follow was complex; its complexity, in
turn, explains its subsequent chaos.9
The new structure was based on an integrated service dependent
upon the organization of multi-tiered administrative units.95 The new
structural mechanism sought to induce greater control from the top
by strengthening the Department of Health and Social Security
(DHSS), whose task was to ensure an efficient service and to main-
tain effectiveness in carrying out departmental policies.9 6 In effect,
the DHSS was "the central policy-forming, monitoring and finding
body of the Health Service, as well as having other national
responsibilities." 97
The new structure was based on the Area Health Authorities
(AHAs), local administrative units who had the responsibility of
running the Health Service at the local level. 8 The AHAs were
under the direction of the same fourteen Regional Health Authori-
ties (RHAs), whose responsibility was the strategic planning of com-
munity health service and hospital services, which were a part of the
original NHS.99 This structured mechanism continued to the district
level and added to the astounding complexity of the reorganization.
The district level was broken down into: (a) District Manage-
ment Teams (DMTs), which managed and coordinated many of the
operational aspects of the service within their areas and assisted in
the formulation of future policies and planning; (b) District Medical
Committees (DMCs) and (c) Health Care Planning Teams
(HCPTs), both of which were made up of local hospital and commu-
nity medical staff and carried the task of detailing local planning
91. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 94-98.
92. See National Health Reorganization Act 1973, brought into force on November 1,
1974 by S.I. 1974 No. 1911.
93. J. ALLSOP, supra note 16, at 60.
94. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 94.
95. See The National Health Service (Transferred Local Authority Property) Order
1974, S.I. 1974 No. 330.
96. J. ALLSOP, supra note 16, at 60.
97. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 97.
98. Id. at 94. "The AHAs were corporately responsible for health care in geographic
areas which were on the whole conterminous with local authority, metropolitan districts and
nonmetropolitan counties . . . [iun all there were ninety English AHAs, of which sixteen were
in Greater London." Id.
99. J. ALLSOP, supra note 16, at 61-62.
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and policies; and (d) Community Health Councils (CHCs), who
were "public watchdogs" for the development of health services."°°
The goal of the reorganization was to create an integrated planning
system10° with an emphasis on management by objectives.1"2
There is to be a fully integrated health service in which
every aspect of health care is provided, so far as it is possible,
locally and according to the needs of the people . . . throughout
the new administrative structure there should be a clear defini-
tion and allocation of responsibilities, there should be a maxi-
mum delegation downwards, matched by accountability
upwards, and a sound management structure should be created
at all levels.101
Yet, the 1974 reform proved to be an absolute disaster; "there
were too many committees, too many administrators, too few quick
decisions, and too much money wasted. °1 0 4 As a result, the NHS,
which had hoped the reorganization would improve its efficiency and
effectiveness, was once again left searching for solutions. In 1982,
another reorganization, aiming to simplify the complexity of the cha-
otic NHS structure, removed the AHA tier and gave its powers to
the Districts; the rest of the system remained unchanged. 0 5
The reorganization period of the NHS resulted in more confu-
sion, higher costs and a continued lack of primary care; "few had
greeted [it] as an unqualified success."' ' The multi-tiered structure
seemed to delay decision-making and planning, cannibalizing the in-
tent of the reorganization.10 7 This complex planning mechanism also
increased the costs of administering and managing the service since
more employees were needed and more resources were wasted.'0 8
Furthermore, nothing was done to alleviate the domination of hospi-
tals, leaving the much needed primary health care field (general
practitioners) still in a state of depletion.109
In sum, the reorganization of the NHS failed in its attempt to
replace chaos with the use of calculated order.1 0 The central defi-
ciency of the NHS remained as it failed to improve the fundamental
function of allocating its resources efficiently. 1
100. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 95.
101. J. ALLSOP, supra note 16, at 61-62.
102. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 97.
103. Id. at 97-98.
104. Id. at 98.
105. This reform took effect on February 15, 1983. See The National Health Service
(Determination of Districts) Amendment (No. 2) Order 1983, S.I. 1983 N. 336.
106. J. ALLSOP, supra note 16, at 70.
107. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
108. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 100-101.
109. Id. at 101.
110. NATIONAL HEALTH IssuEs, supra note 11, at 28.
111. C. LINDSAY, supra note 1, at 83.
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3. Overview of the NHS.-In reviewing the framework and
operation of the National Health Service since its inception forty
years ago, the deficiencies seemingly outweigh the "theoretical" ben-
efits. The concept behind this comprehensive "free-for-all" medical
care service is undoubtedly admirable, but the practical application
of such a system leaves much to be desired." 2 The British system
clearly illustrates this notion.
An analysis of the structure and performance of the National
Health Service throughout its existence illuminates its distinct
characteristics:
[I]t is free, for the most part, at the point of service; it tries
to be uniform throughout; it is short on innovation; it is mono-
lithic and bureaucratic; nowhere is it responsive to consumer de-
mand; it is set up to handle "patients" (those who wait); and
increasingly it is run for the benefit of those who work in it."'
Undoubtedly, the NHS was able to organize and stabilize a
troubled hospital system.1"4 Yet, by encouraging the specialization of
the medical profession, the service created a misallocation of re-
sources as its hospitals became the dominant force in health ser-
vice." 5 As a result, the hospitals were unable to handle the vast in-
crease in demand, and due to the depletion of general practitioners,
the primary health care sector was unable to adequately assist in
solving the problem."' Hence, the British public is forced to wait"'
or seek treatment at expensive private clinics"' which seemingly un-
dermines the purpose and intent of utilizing a "free-for-all" service
which allows everyone the best treatment on the basis of need.
This multi-tiered bureaucratic mechanism not only slows down
the decision and policy-making process," 9 but also fails to adapt to
the rapidly changing nature of the medical field. 20 The depletion of
the primary health care sector is a perfect example of this inelastic-
ity of the NHS to meet changes in demand. The explosion in medi-
cal innovation created vast numbers of treatable cases; yet, the Ser-
vice was unable to revitalize the much-needed general
practitioner. 2' More importantly, by prioritizing health care and
limiting the profits of its participants, the result is an inevitable slow-
112. "[T]he proclaimed case for the NHS is essentially moral rather than economics
. .NATIONAL HEALTH ISSUES, supra note 11, at 103.
113. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 102.
114. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 71-73, 84-86 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
118. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 102.
119. See supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text.
120. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 102-103.
121. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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down in medical progress.'22 It is vital to "encourage freedom to ex-
periment and innovate and to reward success." '23
Instead, this authoritarian system determines what is "urgent"
and demanded by its people while it is consistently constrained by
the lack of public finances.' 24 The complexity of this monolithic sys-
tem hinders the flow of quality information and communication
throughout the system.' 25 As a result, the service lacks management
innovation and development, as illustrated by the Royal Commis-
sion's assessment of the service in 1979: "Unfortunately the informa-
tion available to decision makers in the NHS leaves much to be
desired." '
Clearly, a government-run system is a political tool first and
foremost, and this political link undoubtedly influences resource allo-
cation. 12 7 Inevitably, the achievement of satisfying consumer needs
will be overshadowed by some political objective, whether it is win-
ning votes or meeting government budgets. 28 Somewhere within this
political game, the basis of creating such a service - to provide the
best possible care to all - is diluted, and eventually lost.
IV. Canada
In order to conduct a fair analysis of adopting a centralized,
government-controlled health care system, the United States can
also look to our neighbor to the north. Canada, despite its much
smaller population and relatively short experience with centralized
financing, has adopted elements of national insurance and is econom-
ically and culturally the most comparable country to the United
States.'29 Although its short history with centralized health care pre-
vents it from providing as complete a study as the British system,
Canada's experience with this approach to medical care can still
serve as a valuable learning tool for the United States.
122. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 90.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 102.
A . . . problem is who decides whether some service is fundable under the
definition [of "health"] consensually adopted . . . likely some government offi-
cial. Thus, control of the health insurance system passes into the hands of the
technocracy, and the patient is lost in the shuffle, as indeed lay output in general
(which currently may be provided through political representation and control).
Freedman & Baylis, Purpose and Function in Government-Funded Health Coverage, 12 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 97, 104 (1987).
125. Id. at 101.
126. NATIONAL HEALTH IssuEs, supra note 11, at 3-4.
127. Id. at 4.
128. Id.
129. C. LINDSAY, supra note 1, at 53.
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A. History and Background
The Canadian health care system has undergone a relatively re-
cent evolution from which a government medical network based on a
universal comprehensive public hospital and medical care insurance
plan has emerged. 3 ' Today, the government has assumed the central
role in the health care arena. The administration of Canadian health
services falls primarily under the direction of the ten provincial gov-
ernments which in turn delegate considerable responsibility for com-
munity health to the local and regional authorities.13' The federal
government, in its role of promoting the health of Canadians, centers
its concerns on health matters of a national and international
scope.' 32 More importantly, it provides financial support to provincial
medical and hospital insurance programs, and to the continuation of
development of other health services.'
Seemingly, the underlying reasons for the inception of strong
government intervention in Canada are not very different from those
in Great Britain. Facing steady cost increases, inadequacies in its
resource allocation, and non-accessibility of health care to the poor,
Canada has searched for a solution to its troubled health care sys-
tem.134 Consequently, Canada chose to spurn its reliance on the mar-
ket to allocate its medical resources' on the premise that the mar-
ket system rations according to one's ability, and willingness, to pay
- wealth and information.' Instead, Canada opted for an elimina-
tion of the price barrier in an attempt to bring medical care within
the reach of all of its citizens.' 3 '
The policy underlying its system is premised on the assumption
that an objectively identifiable relation between health care use and
health status exists, both at the individual and collective levels.' 3 8
People have "needs" - as opposed to preferences, de-
mands, or willingess-to-pay - for those forms of health care
which would be judged, by an external, technically competent
observer, to improve or maintain their health status. Further,
the recognition of a need, unlike a more general want or de-
mand, implies some degree of obligation on others in a commu-
130. Evans, Health Care in Canada: Patterns of Funding and Regulation, 8 J. HEALTH
POL. POL'Y & L. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Evans].
131. CULTURAL, PUBLIC AND INFORMATION PROGRAMS BUREAU, GOV'T OF CANADA,
HEALTH AND WELFARE 1 (1983) [hereinafter HEALTH AND WELFARE].
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See Evans, supra note 130, at 1-3, 8-9.
135. Id. at 6. "[Mlarket allocation of [the] benefits [of the scarce resources of human
time, energy, capital and raw materials] is generally viewed as leading to individual and social
outcomes inferior to those available through alternative rationing institutions." Id.
136. Id.
137. C. LINDSAY, supra note 1, at 76.
138. Evans, supra note 130, at 8.
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nity to assist in meeting it.'39
This "external, technically competent observer" in the Canadian sys-
tem is the government; it makes the decisions as to what "needs"
should be addressed, and which should be left unmet.14 °
From this perspective, the primary test of a health care sys-
tem is the quality of the match it achieves between needs and
utilization: its provision of effective care to those who will bene-
fit, and its avoidance of ineffective or harmful services. Seconda-
rily, it should be technically efficient in the use of resources. At
yet another level, a system will influence patterns of income and
wealth distribution - between providers and users or taxpayers,
and among users/taxpayers - depending on how its funds are
raised.""
The Canadian system considers these to be matters of political judg-
ment, warranting the government to classify these issues into
"researchable questions and political choices" which focus on or even
resolve these areas."4 These underlying principles served as the cata-
lyst for government cost-sharing, via the provincial governing bodies,
which dates back to the late 1950's and subsequent federal cost-
sharing which emerged in the late 1970's. 43
B. The Evolution of Government Intervention
In its attempts to implement these social policies based on
"need," the Canadian health care network has substantially differen-
tiated itself from the American system in a crucial way. Although
the delivery systems of the two nations, with medical services pro-
vided primarily by private practitioners reimbursed fee-for-service
and hospitals owned on a voluntary or municipal basis, have re-
mained broadly similar, the key divergence lies in the funding of the
two systems."" The Canadian funding mechanism is the universal
public insurance programs on both the federal and provincial levels
which reimburse all hospital and medical costs through budgetary
allocation and fee-schedule negotiations, respectively." 5 Essentially,
"government in Canada has largely replaced private insurance funds
as the paymaster of doctors and hospitals."""
139. Id.
140. Id. at 9.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. C. LINDSAY, supra note 1, at 69.
144. Evans, supra note 130, at 3.
145. Id.
146. C. LINDSAY, supra note 1, at 72; see also Evans, supra note 130, at 13. "One
public agency, the provincial Minister of Health is responsible for all costs. Providers cannot
play one reimburser against another, or charge patients for amounts insurers refuse to pay."
Id.
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The evolution of the government as curator of this system
originated in 1958 under the guise of the Hospital Insurance and
Diagnostic Services Act. 47 This Act codified agreements between
the federal and provincial governments to mandate provinces to pro-
vide an array of insured medical services to "all of its covered resi-
dents on uniform terms and conditions, without exclusion on grounds
of age, occupation, income or pre-existing conditions."' 8 All prov-
inces were required to provide standard-ward accommodation and
normal hospital in-patient services 4 9 to all residents covered on ei-
ther a pre-payment or tax-financed basis.150 The provinces also be-
gan to insure a comprehensive range of out-patient services to its
eligible citizens.' 5 ' However, these services are included in provincial
insurance plans at provincial discretion; as a result, the services vary
from province to province. 52 The cost of these insured hospital ser-
vices is all but entirely carried by the federal and provincial govern-
ments.' 53 The provinces raise their portion of these costs in a variety
of ways based on local conditions and preferences, with at least some
use of general tax revenues as a source to finance their shares. 54
In addition to the insured hospital services, the government ex-
panded into the field of medical-care insurance. It began by insuring
other services, mainly those of physicians with the inception of the
Medical Care Act of 1968.1 5 This Act called for federal government
147. The Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act, 1958, CONSOLIDATED REG.
OF CANADA ch. 936, (1978) [hereinafter Diagnostic Services Act].
148. HEALTH AND WELFARE, supra note 131, at 5; see also Diagnostic Services Act,
supra note 147, § 3(2) at 7092. The Act provides care to "insured persons," defined as resi-
dents of a province - "persons legally entitled to remain in Canada who make their home and
are ordinarily present in that province, but does not include tourists, transients or visits to the
province" - who are eligible for and entitled to those insured services provided under the laws
of their province. Id.
149. HEALTH AND WELFARE, supra note 131, at 4. Those hospital services normally
supplied to in-patients include "meals, nursing care, laboratory, radiological and other diag-
nostic procedures and most drugs." Id. Services provided by mental and tuberculosis institu-
tions, nursing homes, infirmaries or other custodial care institutions are excluded from the
provisions of the Act. Id.
150. Id. See also Diagnostic Services Act, supra note 147, § 2 at 7091. The Act deals
with two types of hospitals: (I) "contract hospitals" which are private or industrial hospitals
which have contracted with the provinces to protect care; and (2) "financial hospitals," those
owned or operated by the Canadian federal government. Id.
151. HEALTH AND WELFARE, supra note 131, at 4.
Examples of such services, for most provinces, are emergency care to acci-
dent victims, follow-up care in fracture cases, occupational therapy, physiother-
apy and speech therapy, out-patient cytology and cancer radiotherpay, day-care




154. Id. Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan, Mani-
toba and two territories entirely finance their portion of the program cost from this source. For
more information regarding alternative sources utilized by Alberta, British Columbia, Quebec,
Nova Scotia and Ontario, see id. at 5-6.
155. Id. at 6. See also The Medical Care Act, 1968, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. M-8 (1970).
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contributions toward costs associated with insured services of a na-
tional program provided by provincial medical care insurance plans
which meet the following requirements:
a) A plan must be operated on a non-profit basis by a pub-
lic authority responsible to the provincial government for its fi-
nancial transactions.
b) It must make available all medically-required services
rendered by medical practitioners, and these insured services
must be provided on uniform terms and conditions to all resi-
dents of the province; there can be no exclusions because of age,
ability to pay, or other circumstances.
c) The provincial plan must cover no less than 95 per cent
of the total number of insurable residents of the province.
d) For persons normally resident in the province, the pro-
vincial plan must provide "portability" - that is: coverage dur-
ing the waiting-period while a person establishes residence in an-
other province; and coverage during periods of temporary
absence from the province, generally up to one year.'
The Act allows the provinces to finance their portion of the service
costs in any manner they wish, subject only to a provision "whereby
no insured person may be impeded in the effort to obtain, or pre-
cluded from reasonable access to, insured services, either directly or
indirectly, whether by charges made to the insured person or other-
wise."1 57 Similarly, the Act also grants the provinces the freedom to
choose a method to pay providers of services, "subject only to the
provision that the provincial schedules of benefits are on a basis that
assures reasonable compensation for the services rendered." '58
The national government's role in contributing to this national
medical plan has taken on various forms since the Act's adoption.159
Originally, the national government based its contributions to the
provinces, with reimbursements approximating fifty percent of the
share in costs.' The open-ended cost-sharing arrangement changed
with the onset of the Established Programs Financing Act (EPF) of
1977.161 "The main objective of the federal government in instituting
the EPF was to create a reasonably predictable and stable close-en-
156. HEALTH AND WELFARE, supra note 131, at 6.
157. Id. at 7. "The significance of this requirement is that extra charges if imposed,
must not be more than nominal." Id.
158. Id. For a favorable view of the Canadian fee-schedule structure, see Evans, supra
note 130, at 11-12.
159. Weller & Manga, The Push for Reprivatization of Health Care Services in Ca-
nada. Britain, and the United States, 8 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 495, 507-08 (1983) [here-
inafter Weller & Manga].
160. HEALTH AND WELFARE, supra note 131, at 1-2.
161. The Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements and Established Programs Financing
Act, 1977, 1984 Can. Stat. ch. 13 [hereinafter Financing Act].
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ded fiscal transfer,"'62 no longer based directly on provincial costs.
Instead, national contributions were approximated on the basis of
the value of the "tax-room"'" transferred, and made in the form of
per capita payments."' As a secondary objective, the EPF was
designed "to promote cost-cutting and greater efficiency in health,
both by instituting a system whereby all the savings of a province's
cost-cutting program would accrue to the province itself, and by giv-
ing the provinces much greater flexibility in general.'
5
The years following the adoption of the EPF held nothing but
disagreement and turmoil between the national and provincial gov-
ernments, as the national government continually complained that its
contributions to the costs were too excessive.' As a result, the Act
was amended on various occasions and presently employs a complex
"tax-room" arrangement limited by various financial factors."6 7 Con-
sequently, as the national government substantially decreased its
contributions and shifted most of the burden to the provincial level,
the provinces have, in turn, shifted some of the weight onto munici-
palities and the public in the form of budget cutbacks, tax increases,
or increased user charges." 8
In spite of this, many assert that the Canadian system has been
a success.6 9 This belief is based on two notions: "a single source of
funding; and the location of that source at an appropriate level of
government."' 7 ° Advocates of this system contend that "the provin-
cial governments, which are [now] responsible for virtually all medi-
cal and hospital funding, have the political legitimacy, technical ex-
pertise, and financial leverage and incentives to offset the influence
of providers of care.'' In sum, supporters of this system believe
that through utilization of this balanced political market, health care
expenditures can be controlled.' 72 Despite support from some public
health administrators and academics, the problems and developing
trends of the Canadian system confirm the inadequacies of a central-
162. Weller & Manga, supra note 159, at 507.
163. Financing Act, supra note 161, § 18. "Tax-room" equals the amount "by which the
entitlement in respect of that established program applicable to the province for that fiscal
year exceeds the total equalized tax transfer in respect of that established program applicable
to the province for that fiscal year." Id.
164. HEALTH AND WELFARE, supra note 131, at 2. "These payments increased yearly in
accordance with changes in the gross national product, and were adjusted gradually so that all
provinces, at the end of five years, were receiving equal per capita cash contributions." Id.
165. Weller & Manga, supra note 159, at 507.
166. Id.
167. See Financing Act, supra note 161, § 19.
168. Weller & Manga, supra note 159, at 507.






ized structure of health care."'3
C. Overview of the Canadian System
It seems evident that Canada's short experience with a central-
ized, government-funded mode of medical care, hospital insurance,
and extended care broadly confirms the tensions and inadequacies
associated with such a system.174 Throughout the evolution of this
health network, intergovernmental conflict has vastly increased 17 as
the system failed to provide an adequate solution to the Canadian
health dilemmas. Instead, the government, unable to carry the
weight of rising medical costs, has continually shifted the cost bur-
den onto the individual or, even more likely, reduced services.17 ' As a
result of these strains, "[miedicine seems to have taken second place,
as the patient has been seen not as a citizen requiring medical care
but as a taxpayer perhaps willing to pay for medicine, whatever gov-
ernment could extract in taxes.' 77
Canadian health care has been caught in a vise, similar to the
British system, as services are "squeezed between federal financial
controls [such as limits of government contributions and ceilings on
fee-schedules] and increasing demand from patients, rising costs, ad-
vancing techniques, and a growing population.' 78 Moreover, and
even more importantly, as greater emphasis is placed on meeting
budgetary decisions, centralized health networks short on finances
will opt for a shift of available resources from long-term investment
to every day services utilized by voters.1 79 Consequently, the critical
area of medical innovation is tragically neglected as "medical re-
search, new techniques and treatments, hospital laboratories and
hospitals are left underfunded."'1 0
In addition, the "free-for-all" basis of this centralized system
has led to obvious increases in demand, an occurrence similarly ex-
173. See C. LINDSAY, supra note 1, at 69-72.
174. Id. at 69.
175. Weller & Manga, supra note 159, at 512. The changes in financial arrangements
associated with the EPF, despite leading to disagreement between the federal and provincial
governments, have led to objections that the provinces' increased flexibility has been "'at the
expense of mechanisms for enforcing those principles, such as equal accessibility, that were
integral to the shared-cost arrangements." In other words, the federal government has turned
its back on the full realization of health care of Canadians. Id. at 507.
176. Id.
177. C. LINDSAY, supra note I, at 70.
178. Id. "[Pilans [have] already been implemented to reduce substantially the number
of hospital beds in Canada, and real incomes of physicians have been severely eroded by a
combination of government income controls and rapid inflation." Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. "These government decisions are taken, as in all centralized financing systems,
without reference to the preferences of individuals who may wish to continue health expendi-
tures despite economic difficulties." Id.
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perienced in Britain.' Since the consumer pays little or nothing
when he uses the system," 2 it only stands to reason that its idea of
"free" care will vastly increase the use of the health structure and
promote abuse through overuse. As the demand side of this system
continues to increase and the supply side stays the same or decreases
(especially in light of government cuts in expenditures concerning
medical facilities and decreased incentives in the profession as a re-
sult of constricting fee-schedules), 8 3 the quality of care will inevita-
bly suffer.
An important effect of reducing the price of care to zero is
that the ensuing scramble for physician care puts doctors under
pressure to hurry their patients through, to have their nurses
and orderlies perform more tasks, and in general to reduce the
quality of the care provided. Long lines in the waiting room and
the lack of competition among physicians for patients will in the
long run yield a product worth exactly what it is paid for. 84
Furthermore, one of the underlying premises of adopting the
centralized system - making health care more accessible to all
based solely on need, not wealth8 5 - is undermined upon applica-
tion of this "socialized" approach. The reimbursement system uti-
lized by the provinces eliminates the differences in compensation as-
sociated with practicing medicine in particular areas; this is a
natural consequence of fee patterns under a market system. 8'
"Fewer physicians will choose to practice in less-amenable communi-
ties since a particular service commands the same fee regardless of
where it is delivered."' 87 In effect, the Canadian system has driven
its physicians away from the poor. 88 This misallocation of resources,
coupled with the government's increasing shift of the cost burden
onto the public, 8 9 creates a miserable situation for its consumers,
especially those with lower incomes. 90 More and more, those indi-
viduals with the financial means are choosing to visit extra-billing
physicians, who have opted out of the national insurance plan, in
search of higher quality care and less rushed and more personalized
care. '9 Thus, the system based on need, not wealth, is rendered all
181. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
182. C. LINDSAY, supra note 1, at 78.
183. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
184. C. LINDSAY, supra note I, at 79.
185. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
186. C. LINDSAY, supra note I, at 77. "A market pricing structure provides that physi-
cians who practice in unattractive, poor, remote locations earn more than their colleagues who
prefer to practice in attractive urban settings." Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. "It matters little that there is no price barrier if there is no doctor." Id.
189. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
190. See C. LINDSAY, supra note I, at 76-79.




In sum, the centralized framework of the Canadian health net-
work, although still relatively young, has created an environment in
which medical care has stagnated. The system is engrossed in bu-
reaucracy, where decisions are based on the pursuit of budgetary
goals and votes, while consumer demand goes unmet. Once again, as
evidenced by the British experience, the ideology of centralized
medicine, although admirable in theory, fails upon practical applica-
tion. Although Canada intended to open access to medical care to all
citizens, both the rich as well as the poor,' 92 it has instead created a
vast misallocation of resources19 and has shifted the majority of the
financial burden onto the public. 94 Based on the difficulties this sys-
tem has already encountered, and the trends that are presently
evolving, Canada appears to face a future where its valiant objective
to provide health care to everyone is buried beneath the bureaucracy
and inflexibility of its monolithic structure.
V. Analysis
The preceding analysis of the current health care systems em-
ployed by Great Britain and Canada emulate the underlying defi-
ciencies of a centralized form of medicine. Both nations' utilization
of this "need" based system has failed to improve the allocation of
health resources while the quality of care has suffered as those pa-
tients who wait are rushed through their visits. In an attempt to cut
medical costs, these government medical systems concentrate sup-
port on the short-term needs of its users. Critical long-term invest-
ments in medical research, new techniques and new devices are ne-
glected; in effect, medical innovation is paralyzed. In addition, as the
government decreases its contribution to rising medical costs in order
to meet budgetary goals, much of the cost burden is filtered down to
the consumer. These socialized systems produce structures that ra-
tion resources by queuing, resist change, and leave decision-making
to political bureaucracies.'95
Alternatively, the market system - which remains at the root
of the American health care system, despite increased government
intervention in recent years' 6 - is based on the theory that supply
expands to meet demand.' 97 The market philosophy envisions a sce-
nario of "competing delivery systems, each priced according to its
192. C. LINDSAY, supra note I, at 83.
193. See supra notes 178-80, 185-87 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
195. C. LINDSAY, supra note 1, at 73.
196. See J. MEYER, MARKET REFORMS IN HEALTH CARE: CURRENT ISSUES, NEW Di-
RECTIONS, STRATEGIC DECISIONS (1983).
197. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 102.
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costs and chosen by consumers on the basis of quality, cost, and
other factors."198 Although the market theory falls well short of ab-
solute perfection, the same is true of government medicine, 19 9 as evi-
denced by the chaos in Britain and Canada. These socialized systems
have removed the price rationing device without replacing it with an
adequate substitute. 00 It was hoped that "need" would provide the
new criterion;20 1 but instead, health care has been effectively ra-
tioned through queuing in Britain,20 2 and queuing and added costs to
consumers in Canada.2"3 Moreover, this banishment of price from
the health care market has not produced the additional resources to
accommodate those unable or unwilling to pay for them.2 4
In addition, the centralized system lacks the ability to adapt to
the ever-changing medical field, as evidenced by the British system.
"The bureaucratic system is necessarily sluggish - slow to close
down what has become redundant and slow to expand when demand
is expanding . . . [s]uch a system is inherently badly adapted to a
period of rapid change."'205 The market system, on the other hand, is
able to adjust to these changes as consumers demand them.
Similarly, the socialized system removes the profit motive from
the supply side, in effect creating a misallocation of resources 2 6 and
a suppression of medical innovation. 0 7 Physicians have no incentive
to practice in less attractive areas, nor to devote a career toward
innovative research since no reward awaits them. 0 ' "Attempts to
control priorities and to limit profit, therefore, are certain to be
shortsighted and to slow down medical progress. '"209
Furthermore, the socialized system seemingly fails to fit into the
social framework of this nation. Both Canada and Britain are more
regimented and homogeneous 2a0 as a people than the United States,
and therefore, the imposition of such a system is easier. There seems
to be a greater degree of ,passivity on the part of its people in these
nations as well, 21 1 as opposed to the innate instinct of Americans to
go out and get what they want.21 2 Also, the United States' popula-
198. Havighurst, Competition in Health Services: Overview; Issues and Answers, 34
VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1118 (1981) [hereinafter Havighurst].
199. NATIONAL HEALTH ISSUES, supra note 11, at 4.
200. Id. at 2.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See supra notes 168, 181-84 and accompanying text.
204. NATIONAL HEALTH ISSUES, supra note 11, at 4.
205. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 103.
206. NATIONAL HEALTH ISSUES, supra note 11, at 4.
207. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 90.
208. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
209. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 90.
210. See C. LINDSAY, supra note I, at 53-54.
211. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 102; see also Weller & Manga, supra note 159.
212. J. VAIZEY, supra note 38, at 102.
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tion is substantially greater than that of either Britain or Canada,
and the advent of such a socialized system would present a difficult
structural and administrative task. The complex structures which ex-
ist in the British and Canadian systems accentuate the difficulty
which would be involved in designing a system for a nation as large
as the United States.
The socialized systems have proven to be ineffective in creating
its intended health care utopia. The United States, in addressing its
health problems, should reform its market system from within. 13
Some suggested reforms are: to increase competition within the mar-
ket by fully embracing the health maintenance organizations
(HMOs), with the theory here being that the larger the percentage
of the market participating in HMOs, the greater the market-forcing
effect of reducing overall costs - as a result, lower HMO costs will
reduce costs in the fee-for-service system as well;"" allow Medicare
and Medicaid recipients to enroll in a competitively priced basic
health package provided by HMOs;z 5 increase the role of employers
by increasing their employees' selection of health insurance plans;21
and by initiating health education and management plans.217 This
reform will be difficult and will require time to take effect; but it
makes more sense than initiating a costly and complex change to a
system foreign to the framework of this nation.
VI. Conclusion
The effect of introducing a socialized system of medicine gives
the power of decision-making and resource-allocation to a political
mechanism buried in bureaucratic red tape. In the rapidly changing
field of medicine, one that presents unique and perplexing challenges
each day, this sluggish system stagnates the much-needed area of
innovation citizens depend on to survive. The control of health care
should never be placed into the hands of a political operation which
cares more about reducing costs and winning votes; life is entirely
too precious.
John J. Moran
213. C. LINDSAY, supra note 1, at 73.
214. See J. Merrill & C. McLaughlin, Competition v. Regulation: Some Empirical Evi-
dence, 10 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 613, 614 (1986) [hereinafter Merill & McLaughlin].
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